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Résumé / Abstract
Cet article étudie l’effet des incitatifs fiscaux à la R&D à partir d’un
échantillon non cylindré de 434 firmes canadiennes (dont certaines ne font pas
de R&D). Avec les données de Compustat, nous estimons un modèle Tobit
généralisé (à effet fixe). Ce modèle détermine notamment l’effet du prix effectif
de la R&D (indice-B tenant compte des différents plafonds dans l’utilisation des
incitatifs fiscaux) sur le stock de la recherche. En augmentant d’un pourcent le
crédit d’impôt fédéral à la R&D, nous obtenons en moyenne 0,98$ de dépenses
additionnelles de R&D par dollar de dépense fiscale (firme ayant un plafond
d’utilisation du crédit fédéral). Ce résultat est majoré à 1,04$ pour les firmes
pouvant utiliser la totalité du crédit fédéral. Le transfert fiscal représente plus de
80 % du cout du soutien à la R&D par le gouvernement.
This study examines the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives using an
unbalanced panel of 434 Canadian firms. Not all firms in the sample are R&D
performers. A B-index summarizing the various tax incentives for R&D is
constructed for each firm, taking into account individual ceilings in the use of
the relevant tax incentives. A generalized Tobit model with fixed effects is
estimated. A one percent increase in the federal tax credit to R&D yields an
average of $0.98 additional R&D expenditure per dollar of tax revenues
foregone (for firms with a ceiling in their use of federal tax credit). Using the
same measure on firms which are not subject to a ceiling, we obtain $1.04. Tax
transfers represent more than 80% of the cost of government support to R&D.
Mots Clés : Incitatifs fiscaux, R&D, modèle Tobit généralisé, Canada
Keywords : Tax incentives, R&D, generalized Tobit panel, Canada
JEL : H32, O31, O38
1 Introduction
Many empirical studies have shown that research and development (R
& D) yields an above-average private rate of return and that the social
rate of return exceeds the private rate of return. These two propositions
suggest that it is in the interest of policy makers to encourage R & D. In
light of this, governments have adopted a number of scal measures to
encourage research and development. These incentive packages involve
substantial amounts. In 1992 in Canada, federal tax credits for R & D
(excluding provincial tax breaks) amounted to $1.1 billion, accounting
for about 20% of R & D expenditures by Canadian rms
1
.
Governments have been questioning whether these expenditures on
research are a wise use of taxpayers' dollars. This question is particularly
pertinent for Canada, with one of the lowest R & D/GDP ratios of
the OECD countries along with the most generous R & D incentive
programs, especially in Quebec
2
. The goal of this study is to verify
whether Canadian rms respond to tax incentives to R & D and, if
so, to what extent? A number of studies have examined this issue,
but the results are ambiguous. We shall re-examine this question using
data on Canadian rms from the Compustat data bank. Firm-level
data are particularly appropriate since tax incentives vary between rms.
Therefore, these data allow us to distinguish between dierent rms'
capacity to benet from them.
In the next section we present the framework of tax incentives to R
& D in Canada. In section 3 we review the results of earlier studies.
Section 4 presents the results of our research, while section 5 discusses
the econometric specication of the model. In section 6 we interpret our
results, and section 7 examines the limitations of our study. Section 8
provides a concluding look at the policy implications of our work. Fi-
nally, the appendices contain a list of the industries from which the rms
in our sample are drawn, denitions and data sources, details of the con-
struction of the tax-incentives index, and a more in-depth presentation
1
Source: Revenue Canada, Statistical Services Division and Statistics Canada,
cat. 88-202.
2
Canada is one of the most generous providers of tax incentives to R & D. To
illustrate, for 1993-4 Warda (1994) calculated a B-index, measuring the present value
of pre-tax revenue necessary to recover the cost of one dollar of R & D, of 0.691 for
Canada, 0.770 for Australia, 0.893 for the U.S., 0.910 for France, 1.00 for Japan and
the U.K., and 1.057 for Germany. Among Canadian provinces, Quebec's tax laws are
the most propitious to research. A Deloitte and Touch (1995) study found that for
large corporations in 1995 the net after-tax cost of a dollar of R & D was $0.364 in
Quebec while it was $0.401 in Ontario and $0.381 in the other Canadian provinces.
For small companies the dierence is greater: the numbers being $0.279, $0.427, and
$0.426 respectively.
1
of the data.
2 Construction of an Aggregate Index of
Tax Incentives to R & D
Over the years government support for scientic research and experimen-
tal development (R & D to simplify) has assumed many forms: immedi-
ate deduction of R & D expenditures, federal and provincial tax credits,
tax credits on incremental research, partial reimbursement, provision for
carry forward and carry back and transfer to associate partners of un-
used tax credits, and many more. These incentives have varied with the
region in which the R&D is done, the size of the rm, and the rm's
capacity to use them.
Let us briey summarize tax incentives to R & D in Canada. At the
federal level, deductibility of R & D has always been a feature of the scal
system, with some variations in the criteria for eligible expenditures.
Since the mid 1970-s, the research tax credit has been used extensively,
and its scope has been extended several times. The incremental research
tax credit was introduced in the early 1960-s. It was abandoned in
1983 with the introduction of the scientic research credit transferable
to investors. This rule gave rise to abuses, however, and two years later
was replaced with a partial reimbursement mechanism and formulae for
carrying unused credits forward. In recent years, the Quebec, Ontario,
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Manitoba provnces have introduced
their own tax credits on the level or the growth of R & D, which may,
or may not, reduce eligibility to federal tax credits.
3
We constructed an index of R & D-related tax incentives comprising
all the determinants we were able to quantify. However, some measures
could not be included because we did not have the necessary data: i.e.
streamlined processing of tax credits since 1988, dierential treatment
of R & D expenditures in other countries, reduced tax-credit eligibility
due to government assistance or contractual payments, or dierential tax
credits applied to certain types of R & D, such as fundamental research,
R & D joint ventures or environmental research
4
. Our index measures
3
For further information on the history of tax incentives to R & D in Canada we
direct the reader to the following sources, on which we drew, for the regulations and
the scal parameters: Doern (1995), Clark et al. (1993), Warda (1990), Warda (1994),
McFetridge and Warda (1983), Deloitte & Touche (1995), Conseil de la science et de
la technologie (1996), Department of Finance and Revenue Canada (1994), Lalonde
(1983). Corporate income tax rates by province are from Williamson and Lahmer
(1982, 1986, 1992), Sweeney and Robertson (1989), Lord and Gagne (1989).
4
Note that tax credits to R & D based on wages, which we consider, represent the
2
the ratio of the net cost of a dollar spent on R & D, after all quantiable
tax incentives have been accounted for, to the net income from one dollar
of revenue
5
. For example, if R & D outlays are entirely deductible from
taxable income, and if the corporate income tax is 50%, then the eective
cost of a dollar of R & D is $0.50. One dollar of sales revenue also yields
$0.50. Consequently, the tax incentives to research index is equal to
one: one dollar of pre-tax income is required to recuperate the cost of
investing one dollar in research. If the tax-credit rate is 20%, and if the
proportion of R & D deductible for tax is reduced by the amount of this
credit, the eective cost of one dollar of R & D falls to $0.40, which
yields a ratio of 0.8 given a corporate tax rate of 50%. The formula we
used to calculate the global rate of incentives to R & D is described in
appendix C.
3 Review of the Literature
Ideally, the ecacy of tax incentives to R & D would be evaluated us-
ing cost-benet analysis, i.e. comparing the social cost of foregoing the
additional tax (or shifting it from one use to another) with the social
benet of additional R & D expenditure attributable to these measures.
This type of analysis requires detailed information on alternative uses of
the taxes dedicated to R & D and the benets which are sacriced in
consequence, as well as a knowledge of all indirect fallouts from the en-
suing research and the administrative costs of a research-support policy.
In the absence of this information, the alternative approach used in the
literature consists of estimating how much R & D is generated per dollar
of tax expenditure. If the extra R & D exceeds the forgone tax revenue,
then, as a rst approximation, this policy is preferable to direct research
funding by the government
6
.
A rst method of analyzing the eciency of tax incentives to R & D
relies on factual observation. Thus, Lebeau (1996) and Gregoire (1995),
using a sample of Quebec rms contributing over 75% of the province's
R & D eort, notice that after 1986 the value of R & D increases much
more than the tax credits given to Quebec companies during this pe-
largest share of research tax credits. In Quebec, in 1994, they represented about 83%
of the total.
5
Our measure corresponds to the B-index proposed by McFetridge and Warda
(1983).
6
Otherwise, the government assumes responsibility for research and performs an
amount of research at least as great as that represented by the forgone taxes. Again,
to justify this reasoning, research nanced by the government must yield social ben-
ets at least as great as that performed by private rms.
3
riod. They observe an increase of over 100% in the number of small
and medium-sized rms performing R & D in Quebec between 1986
and 1992 (which, incidentally, coincides with an eleven percent decrease
among large companies performing R & D). Finally, they nd a length-
ening of the time horizon of research projects and a growth in R & D
from foreign sources. Clearly, as informative as these data are, they do
not allow us to attribute full credit for this increase in R & D to tax
incentives. The eects of other pertinent variables must be netted out
7
.
A second approach consists of surveying rms. Manseld and Switzer
(1985) conducted a survey of 55 Canadian companies. The composition
of their sample is representative of the set of all rms in Canada perform-
ing R & D. The results reveal that R & D generated by tax incentives
did not amount to more than 40% of the lost tax revenue. An econo-
metric regression of R & D expenditures, where the exogenous variables
contain dummies identifying dierent scal periods, conrm the results
of these surveys. However, a survey by the Conference Board (Warda
and Zieminski (1995)) reveals that the R & D tax credit constitutes a
more important source of funds for smaller rms. An Australian study
(Bureau of Industry Economics (1993)) reveals that only 17% of Aus-
tralian R & D is performed in response to tax incentives, equivalent to
incremental growth of research between $0.60 and $1.00 per dollar of tax
expenditure.
The third approach to the problem consists of performing an econo-
metric estimation of the relationship between R & D and tax incentives.
We can further divide this procedure into three groups. The rst group
comprises studies in which the explanatory variables include a dichoto-
mous variable assuming the value one if there was a usable tax credit
to R & D (cf. Berger (1992) and Baily and Lawrence (1992)). This
is a rough approach, as it makes no allowance for dierences in the
level of credits between rms. The second group of econometric stud-
ies regresses R & D expenditure on a number of explanatory variables
including the eective price of R & D, which varies with tax incentives
(Baily and Lawrence (1992), Hines (1993), Hall (1993), Bloom, Grith
and Van Reenen (1997)
8
). This approach has the shortcomings of not
being founded on a structural model and ignoring the stock aspect of
knowledge associated with R & D
9
. Studies in the third group specify a
7
The evidence from the U.S. reported by Cordes (1989) is also essentially of a
factual nature.
8
The Hall (1993) and Bloom, Grith and Van Reenen (1997) studies focus essen-
tially on ow elasticities.
9
There is a further literature on the eectiveness of subsidies to R & D. In this vein,
Page (1995) estimates that direct assistance to R & D received by a sample of Quebec
4
demand equation for the stock of R & D that depends on scal parame-
ters through the user cost of capital (Bernstein (1986), Hines (1993),
Mamuneas-Nadiri (1993), and Shah (1994)). Whichever approach is
adopted, it is important to clearly distinguish between elasticities with
respect to scal parameters relating to stocks and to ows of R & D.
Table 1 summarizes the principal empirical studies on the eective-
ness of tax incentives to R & D
10
. Flow elasticities are generally greater
that stock elasticities. Baily and Lawrence (1992) report a short-term
elasticity of  0:95, Hines (1993) nds  1:6 and Hall (1993) elasticities
between  0:8 and  1:5 in the short run and between  2:0 and  2:7 in
the long run. Only Bloom, Grith and van Reenen (1997) obtain fairly
low elasticities ( 0:10 in the short run and  0:79 in the long run). The
rst studies to estimate a demand elasticity for the stock of R & D with
respect to its user cost were based on an ad hoc dynamic specication
with distributed lags. Goldberg (1979) estimates  0:39 for the short-
term elasticity and  0:92 for the long-term elasticity on panel data from
American manufacturing industries. Nadiri (1980) nds an elasticity of
 0:16 in the short term and unity in the long term for the entire U.S.
manufacturing sector. Some subsequent studies rene the specication
of the R & D demand equation using dynamic models of factor demand
based on the notion of adjustment cost. Cardani and Mohnen (1984) and
Mohnen, Nadiri and Prucha (1986) estimate the own-price elasticity of
R & D from time-series on manufacturing in ve countries of the G-7.
Their estimates are between  0:04 and  0:10 in the short run (dened as
the rst stage of the adjustment process) and between  0:25 and  0:55
in the long run. Bernstein (1986) nds short-term elasticities of  0:13
and long-term values of  0:32 for Canadian rms. Nadiri and Prucha
(1990) arrive at short-term elasticities of  0:03 and long-term elasticities
of  0:12 for the Bell company in the United States. Using panel data
on rms, Bernstein and Nadiri (1995) derive long-term elasticities be-
tween  0:43 and  0:50 estimated separately for four research-intensive
U.S. industries. Hines (1993) obtains an own-price elasticity for research
nanced by rms of  1:2, and Mamuneas and Nadiri (1995) of  1:0.
Estimates based only on R & D funded by private rms seem higher
than those which also include R & D nanced from public funds.
As to the evaluation of additional research per dollar of tax expen-
diture, results are divided. Eisner, Albert and Sullivan (1983) stress the
fact that few rms were able to take advantage of tax credits for incre-
rms, operating exclusively in Quebec (thus essentially small rms), generates $1.89
of additional R & D for every dollar received.
10
For a more comprehensive list of empirical studies on the ecectiveness of R &
D tax incentives, see Oce of Technology Assessment (1995).
5
mental research in the U.S., and that in some cases the eect could even
be perverse. They further fail to nd a signicant eect on R & D expen-
diture attributable to this policy. Manseld and Switzer's survey (1985)
nds that for each tax dollar forgone because of R & D tax incentives
only $0.40 in additional R & D is generated. Combining the eects of a
change in the scal parameters on the user cost of R & D and of a change
in this cost on the demand for R & D, Bernstein (1986) calculates that
a forgone dollar of tax revenue generates $0.80 of new R & D, if output
is maintained constant, and between $1.05 and $1.70 if the spillover im-
pact of output on R & D is considered. Using the same procedure, the
General Accounting Oce (1989) estimates that the multiplier eect is
only $0.35. In contrast, Manuneas and Nadiri (1993) derive $0.95, Hines
(1993), $1.20 to $1.90, Shah (1994) $1.80 and Berger (1993) $1.74.
Various reasons may account for the dierences in these estimates.
The price-elasticity estimates may vary depending on whether the spec-
ication is on R & D stocks or ows, whether the estimates are for long-
or short-term elasticities, whether we are examining total R & D or only
R&D nanced by rms. The dierences also depend on how the cost
of the incentive packages to the government are calculated. It may be
the observed cost of a policy or the one reported by the implementing
agency (Berger (1993), Manseld and Switzer (1985), Shah (1994)). It
may be estimates or simulations of the changes in costs that rms face
following a tax credit (Bernstein (1986), Mamuneas and Nadiri (1993),
Hall (1993), Hines (1993)). Finally, it must be borne in mind that all
incentive policies are not equal, and may thus yield dierent results.
For example, Hines (1993) simulates the eect on American rms of a
100% deductibility from revenues for R & D expenditures as opposed to
deductibility prorated to domestic sales. Other American studies have
largely focused on tax credits for incremental research, while Canadian
studies tend to examine the global eect of various means of tax support
for R & D in Canada.
6
Table 1: Empirical studies of the eectivenessof tax incentives to R & D
Authors Data price elast. R & D/$tax Cost to govt. Approach
of R&D
a
Mansfield Canada Survey 0.4 observed flow
& Switzer firms responses
(1985) survey
Bernstein Canada  0:13 (ST) 0.8 elast: cost/ stock
(1986) firms  0:32 (LT) fisc. param.
panel
Shah Canada  0:16 (ST) 1.8 observed stock
(1994) industries
panel
Baily & United States  0:95 (ST) flow
Lawrence industries
(1992) time-series
Hines United States  1:2 (stock) 1.2 (stock) individually stock
(1993) firms  1:6 (flow) 1.9 (flow) simulated flow
panel
Hall United States  0:8 to  1:5 (ST) 2.0 individually flow
(1993) firms  2:0 to  2:7 (LT) simulated
panel
Mamuneas United States  1:0 (ST) 0.95 elast: cost/ stock
Nadiri industries fisc. param.
(1993) panel
Berger United States dichotomous 1.74 observed flow
(1993) firms variables
panel
Asmussen France R & D w/t increm. 0.26 observed flow
Berriot firms R&D tax credit
(1993) elast. = 0.013
Bureau of Australia Survey 0,6 to 1,0 observed flow
Ind. Enterprises responses
Economics Survey
(1993)
Bloom, Panel of  0:10 (ST) flow
Griffith and 8 countries  0:79 (LT)
van Reenen aggregates
(1997)
ST = short-term LT = long-term
a) A R & D flow or stock-price elasticity, depending on the study referred to.
4 Data
Our study is unique in that it uses rm-level data, assigning a specic
eective price of research to each rm taking into account its particular
situation and relevant tax-credit ceilings.
We use annual rm data for the period from 1975 to 1992 drawn
from Standard and Poor's Compustat (Canadian le) database
11
. This
data contains a good deal of information, including expenditure on R &
D and some technological and nancial characteristics of the rm. The
database features the largest rms (in terms of revenues or capitaliza-
tion) traded on the major U.S. exchanges (New York Stock Exchange,
11
The production deators from the input-output tables for 1993 were not yet
available when we began our study. For 1994, there were many holes in the Compustat
database.
7
American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ) as well as those belonging to
the TSE300 on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The information is drawn
from annual reports and from the 10K reports submitted to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States (the American
equivalent to Canada's provincial securities commissions).
The Compustat database has been extensively used to study U.S.
rms, but not Canadian rms. It contains several selection biases as it
comprises primarily large, publicly-traded rms with substantial capi-
talization. To our knowledge, however, there exists no publicly available
database of Canadian companies which is more complete.
To obtain reliable empirical results, we rst needed to clean the data,
eliminating rms with anomalous characteristics. First, we removed
companies we suspected of receiving direct R & D subsidies, either from
government or from other rms. Tax incentives have little if any inu-
ence on these rms, and hence we chose to withdraw them from our sam-
ple. We used two methods to identify such rms. First, sometimes the
database itself indicated that they received subsidies from government
or other sources. Second, if the variable \revenues before extraordinary
items" plus R & D expenditures was negative for three consecutive years,
we eliminated all data relative to the rm in question. This criterion is
based on the notion that a business cannot for a long time stay alive
while running decits. These rms may belong to corporations which
under the Canadian Income Tax Act and the Quebec \loi de l'impo^t sur
le revenu" may impute part of their tax credits to associated companies
(sponsors) who can reduce their tax bill. Not having the necessary infor-
mation to trace the associated companies, we chose to drop those rms.
It is conceivable that a rm may have received government subsidies for a
single year. In this case, we compared its R & D intensity (R & D/sales)
before and after the subsidy. In the absence of a signicant change, we
retained the company, assuming the subsidy to be minimal. Otherwise,
the observation was dropped, along with all preceding and subsequent
ones, if there were three or less. In a very few cases we dropped a single
observation in the middle of the sample, treating the remaining series as
two companies (in order to have continuous data).
Our second selection criterion dealt with the denition of R & D
expenditures. Compustat informs us that for some years certain rms
inated their R & D expenditures with \engineering"-type spending.
These outlays are by denition fairly routine, and should be classied as
operating costs rather than as R & D. Moreover, they are not eligible
for R & D tax credits. We eliminated these rms, as we were unable
to determine the proportion of spending attributable to engineering in
overall R & D expenditures. However, this \inating" was an occasional
8
occurrence, and if we were unable to detect a signicant change induced
in the R & D intensity, either before or after, we retained the rm
12
.
The third exclusion criterion was based on the R & D intensity vari-
able. We expect this ratio to be less than one. Simple accounting princi-
ples imply that expenditures in this eld cannot exceed the rm's total
revenue. However, this ratio may exceed unity in the case of new rms,
which may not immediately generate sucient revenue to cover their
research costs. Nonetheless, a rm will not be viable if it consistently
has an R & D intensity greater than one. In fact, the companies we
eliminated on these grounds belonged to the set of companies suspected
of receiving subsidies.
Our fourth exclusion criterion dealt with holding companies. We
eliminated seventeen rms on this basis, including BCE Inc., which in-
corporates Bell Canada, Northern Telecom, and Bell Mobility in our
sample.
Finally, to ensure a suciently long time horizon for the retained
rms, we dropped those with fewer than four observations.
Thus, of the 5642 observations on 573 rms in the initial sample, we
retained an unbalanced panel of 434 rms for a total of 4859 observations
in the restricted sample. Table A4.1 (in the appendix) reveals that 86
rms were eliminated because of insucient observations. From the 487
companies not eliminated on this basis, 49 were dropped on the basis of
one or several of the other criteria.
We used the database Cancorp plus from Disclosure Inc. (1995) as
well as an internal database from Industry Canada, Bureau of Corporate
Aairs and Legislative Policy to locate the rms, as the eective price
of R & D varies across provinces. Since we had no information on where
each rm conducted its R & D, we assumed that it was distributed
uniformly among those provinces in which the rm was active
13
.
The country of origin of the controlling entity was found in the
Statistics Canada publication \Inter-corporate ownership", catalogue 61-
517
14
. We deated sales data using the implicit production price by
12
Even the criteria established by Revenue Canada and Statistics Canada to dis-
tinguish R & D from other innovation related activities are not necessarily clear to
accountants or to respondents of the questionaire of the R & D survey. For example,
routine testing, minor product adaptations and corrections are not recognized as R
& D for purposes of the Income Tax Act.
13
Regressions using the alternative hypothesis that the rms performed all of their
R & D in the province in which they were incorporated did not produce signicantly
dierent results. Fifteen of them conducted their research in several provinces and
ve in a province other than the one in which they are incorporated.
14
Owing to a lack of resources, we only gathered this data for the years 1982 and
1992. Notice that the structure of foreign ownership of the rms in our sample
9
industry from Statistics Canada's input-output tables, catalogue 15-201
and 15-202. The industry to which each rm is deemed to belong is the
Canadian equivalent of the industry associated with it by Compustat.
Together with Statistics Canada we constructed R & D deators for
39 industries. These deators are chain Laspeyres indices based on the
implicit research-personnel wage-and-benets index for the research sta
and on the implicit GDP price-index for other current expenditures, as
well as for plant and equipment used for R & D. Data on R & D, R &
D personnel and R & D labor costs for each industry were drawn from
the survey on industrial R & D from Statistics Canada (cat. 88-202).
About 60% of research costs are industry specic. As to the remainder,
it appeared plausible to us to assume that these costs do not vary much
between sectors, and thus the GDP price-index serves as a representative
mean price
15
. Complete surveys of industrial R & D were only performed
in odd years between 1973 and 1981. Statistics Canada estimated total
R & D for even years during this period using data from a smaller survey,
but data on wages and stang for R & D from these surveys are not very
reliable. Data on the wage index for R & D sta for even years between
1973 and 1981 were constructed by interpolating the ratios (research-
labor cost)/(total R & D) and (research personnel)/(total R & D) and
relating them to total R & D estimates for the even years.
The initial stock of R & D was constructed on the assumption that
it accumulated over the entire sampling period at the same average rate
as gross production
16
. This procedure yields an initial stock unique to
each rm. For the other years, the R & D stock accumulates according
to the permanent inventory formula. The user cost of research is dened
as the eective price multiplied by the sum of the interest rate (we used
ten-year and longer government bonds from the Bank of Canada), and
of the depreciation rate of R & D, xed at 10%.
Before proceeding to describe the model, we shall present some char-
acteristics of our data (a more detailed analysis can be found in appendix
D). Among the 434 rms in our sample (after eliminations), only 108 per-
form, or declare performing, R & D. For about 70 of these we have data
remained very stable. Only seven rms changed country of control between these
two years. We used foreign-ownership data for 1992.
15
Our R & D deator is similar to that used by Jae and Griliches (cf. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (1981)).
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The initial stock is constructed from the equation:
R
i0
=
P
T
t
I
it
(1  )
T t
(1 + 
i
)
T
  (1  )
T
;
where 
i
is estimated by the regression ln (Q
it
) = [ln (1 + 
i
)] t+ ln (Q
i0
) + 
it
:
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for ten consecutive years or more. Companies conducting R & D are
relatively over-represented in our sample, as for the Canadian economy
as a whole only 0.3% of rms performed research in 1980 (Department
of Finance (1983)).
The fact that the R & D gures reported in Compustat include R &
D performed outside of Canada matters only to the extent that support
for this research is more limited (for example, it is limited to current ex-
penses and not supported by provincial tax credits). Overall, our sample
of 416 rms, of which 78 performed R & D, represents 39% of all R & D in
the Statistics Canada survey for 1989. This percentage does not include
the major R & D performers in Canada since, in 1992, 25 Canadian rms
conducted 45% of total research there (Statistics Canada, cat. 88-202)
17
.
Small and medium-sized companies are also under-represented. Among
rms which declare employment (this data is missing for several rms),
only 25% have fewer than 200 workers. Thus we have a truncation at
both extremes of the distribution of rms.
The index of tax incentives (F1) ranges from 0.5 to 1.8 for dierent
rms. A large part of this variation derives from ceilings on the use of
tax incentives unique to each rm. Thus, for 20% of the observations
on rms performing R & D, these expenditures could not be deducted
entirely because the tax bill was not high enough in the year in which
they were incurred (
0
< 1, cf. the appendix). In only 11% of cases tax
credits could not be entirely claimed in the year in which the R & D was
performed (H < 1) : For 22% of observations with R & D, tax credits for
incremental research could not be claimed ( = 0) :
5 Econometric Specication
We have a number of rms, some of which perform R & D while others
do not, or do not declare it. Firms listed on U.S. exchanges are obliged
to report their R & D expenditures to the SEC if these are substantial
or exceed one percent of gross revenues. For these rms we may assume
that if no R & D expenditures were declared, or if the data is missing,
then none was performed
18
. About half of the rms in our sample did
not submit a 10K report to the SEC. Numbers published by Compustat
17
Comparing the top 100 Canadian companies in terms of R & D budget from
Research Money (June 1995) and from the TSE300 list, we notice that the R & D
rms not included in our sample are also not in the TSE300. We thus have a selection
bias toward rms which are heavily capitalized.
18
Bound et al. (1984) make the same assumption. As these authors indicate, it
may be the case for some missing data that Compustat either did not obtain the
information, or deemed it not to be true R & D.
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for these companies are retrieved from their annual reports. In large
part these are Canadian rms belonging to the TSE300, i.e. not traded
on American exchanges. We are condent that the R & D disclosed in
these companies' annual reports is relatively complete for the following
three reasons. First, the proportion performing R & D is about the same
as for the entire sample, so there does not seem to be a systematic bias
toward not declaring R & D among these rms. Second, according to
Canadian accounting standards, rms are expected to report R & D in
their nancial statements
19
. Third, in our sample all but three of the
top 100 R & D performing rms declare R & D operations
20
.
Our data is thus well suited to the application of the generalized to-
bit model. Firms perform research if g (z
it
) + u
2;it
> 0; where z
it
is a
vector of variables determining the threshold below which rms perform
no R & D, and u
2;it
is a random term. We assume that g () is a loga-
rithmic function. If g (z
it
) + u
2;it
 0; rms do not engage in R & D.
For those that do, the potential investment is realized. Since R & D
expenditures constitute an investment in intangible capital, it is more
satisfactory from a theoretical standpoint to specify a capital accumu-
lation equation rather than a simple investment function. We further
assume that depreciation occurs at a rate ; set equal to 10%
21
. More-
over, many empirical studies have shown that there are adjustment costs
associated with the accumulation of the stock of R & D (organizing the
research team, project nancing, elaboration of the research program).
Nonetheless, instead of specifying an adjustment-cost function, we opted
to use a partial stock-adjustment formulation, which is consistent with
the adjustment-cost model (on net investments as well as on replacement
investments) (cf. Lucas (1967)). The complete model is thus:
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
[R
it
  (1  )R
i;t 1
] = 0
if g(z
it
) + u
2;it
 0
[lnR
it
  lnR
i;t 1
] = [lnR

it
(x
it
)  lnR
i;t 1
] + u
1;it
if g(z
it
) + u
2;it
> 0
(5.1)
where R

it
, the desired stock of R & D at time t; is a double logarith-
mic function of the variables x
it
; R
it
is the actual stock of R & D at the
19
See the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Handbook, Accounting
Recommendations, updated as of June 1995, section 3450, research and development
costs.
20
The three rms from Research Money (1992) for which we do not have R &
D data are Seagram, Xerox, and Repap. These are all multinationals with foreign
oces, and it is possible that their R & D is not accounted for in the Compustat
Canadian le.
21
In the literature, this rate varies between 10% and 25%.
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end of period t;  is the proportion of the adjustment realized at time t;
and where the random variables u
1;it
and u
2;it
have a normal bivariate
distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix : We chose a double
logarithmic formulation because it yielded the best results and had the
further advantage of reducing the possibility of heteroscedasticity in the
error terms. We also postulated independence between observations
22
.
Estimation of this type of model using maximum likelihood yields con-
sistent estimators (cf. Maddala (1983), Gourieroux (1989)).
Among the variables x
it
and z
it
which determine the existence and
level of R & D activity, we are primarily interested in the eective price
of research, which is the research deator divided by the sales price
and multiplied by the B-index, dened in appendix C. A simultaneous
equation bias may exist to the extent that tax incentives vary with the
level of research and that rms hit ceilings on deductions and tax credits.
This bias should be small, since our sample is biased toward large rms
which in general do not benet from the most generous tax breaks and
have sucient income not to be aected by these ceilings. To make the
demand for R & D homogeneous of degree zero in prices, we deated
the eective price of R & D by the sales price rather than a particular
input price, since the sales price acts as a general index of the input
prices (even when it incorporates a constant mark-up over the average
production price).
Several other R & D determinants must be considered to net out
their eects on the amount of R & D undertaken
23 24
. These are in
22
Since I
it
= R
it
  (1  )R
i;t 1
; we see that our stock model simplies to a ow
model if depreciation is immediate ( = 1) :
23
As mentioned below, the introduction of dummy variables for years and indus-
tries among the explanatory variables renders the assumption of independence of
error terms between observations more acceptable. We could also have accounted for
variability in the tax incentives, which Hall (1983) found signicant for the United
States. However, Canadian policy in this area has been more stable than that of the
U.S. To neutralize the eect of rms performing R & D in other countries which,
on one hand, benet less from Canadian tax incentives and, on the other hand, may
benet from such arrangements in the host country, we could have included a vari-
able for foreign holdings or, better yet, indices of tax incentives for these countries.
Constructing such a variable was beyond the scope of this study.
24
Because of the unavailability of data, we were not able to account for growth
prospects. These could be measured by observed growth (assuming perfect foresight),
or by Tobin's q but at the cost of losing quite a number of observations. Also, we
chose not to include the variable \age of the rm" in the regression despite the fact
that we often observe a considerable drop in the R & D/sales ratio after the rst few
observations (for aforementioned reasons). For one, we must not assume that rms
newly included in Compustat are necessarily new rms: they appear in this listing
when they have achieved a certain degree of capitalization. Second, exploratory
regressions did not yield a signicant coecient for this variable.
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order:
1. Year dummies| These capture technological progress or other
time-specic eects, such as changes in R & D tax incentives which
we were not able to incorporate into our B-index of tax incentives.
2. Industry dummies | They capture all industry-specic factors not
accounted for by the other variables, such as the degree of concen-
tration and technological opportunities.
3. R & D level for the industry | A positive impact indicates a
spillover eect, a strategic complementarity between the rm's re-
search and that of other companies in the industry. This may be
due, for example, to the need for R & D to absorb within-industry
technological externalities. A negative impact reveals a substi-
tutability between the rm's own research and that of its com-
petitors. Most studies have found complementarity for large rms
and for hi-tech. rms and substitutability for the others (Mohnen
(1996)).
4. Accumulated retained earnings | In order to protect their trade
secrets as much as possible, companies prefer to nance research
from their own funds rather than borrowing from banks or nan-
cial markets (Himmelberg and Peterson (1994)). Thus, R & D
expenditures are more likely to occur when internal nancing is
available (Berger (1993)).
5. Size | Because of returns to scale in R & D, greater R & D nanc-
ing possibilities for large rms and the perspective of higher returns
to R & D associated with larger markets, one would expect size
to be positively correlated with R & D eort. On the other hand,
larger rms tend to be burdened with bureaucratic decision-making
processes, which may attenuate this advantage. The empirical ev-
idence on this matter is ambiguous. Scherer (1980) cites studies
which have established the existence of a threshold, above which
R & D grows more slowly than sales. Other studies have shown
that the relationship between sales and research intensity has an
inverted U-shape, with the most active rms being medium sized.
Bound et al. (1984) found a U-shaped relationship. We measure
size by total sales
25
.
25
Data on employment was missing for too many rms to be a useful measure of
size.
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6. The nationality of the rm's head oce | It is often claimed that
Canada has the lowest level of R & D eort of the G-7 because
of its high proportion of foreign controlled companies, which are
presumed to perform most of their research in the home country.
Hines (1993, 1994) has shown that multi-national rms are not
indierent to tax incentives when locating their R & D around
the world. Bloom, Grith and Van Reenen (1997) conrm these
results.
7. Physical capital | This may be a complement or a substitute for
research. Most empirical studies conclude that the relationship is
complementary.
We also estimated a model of random individual eects, in which
a random term 
j;i
; j = 1; 2 is added to the error term u
j;it
: In that
case, we assume that the -s are distributed independently of the u-s
and follow a normal-bivariate distribution N (0;
) ; where the elements
of 
 are parameters to be estimated. This version of the model was
estimated by the simulated maximum-likelihood method. In the un-
conditional likelihood function, the double integral with respect to the

j;i
's is replaced by a mean of n random draws from (
1i
; 
2i
)
26
. These
estimates may not be consistent if the stochastic individual eects are
correlated with some of the explanatory variables. To correct for this
eventuality, we also estimated the random-eects model including among
the independent variables their respective means for each rm.
To ensure that the covariance matrix of the error terms  is positive
denite, we reparametrized its elements :  =
 
1; 
2
1
; 
2
2

; where 
1
=
1;  is the coecient of correlation between u
1;it
and u
2;it
; and 
2
is the
standard deviation of u
2;it
; as w = ln (
2
) and z = 0:5 ln
h
(1+)
(1 )
i
: We
also reparameterized the elements of 
.
If the error term is heteroscedastic, and if this is not accounted for in
the formulation of the maximum-likelihood function, the estimators are
no longer consistent. To avoid problems of heteroscedasticity we used
ordinary least squares to perform a preliminary estimation (for each
specication we explored) of the quantitative part of the model, and
26
To perform random draws from the distribution of (
1i
; 
2i
) with covariance 
;
we can proceed as follows: draw from two independent standard normal distributions
N (0; 1) ; b
i
and g
i
; then setting !
1
=
p
!
11
; !
2
=
p
!
22
and  =
!
12
(!
1
!
2
)
generate

1i
= b
i
!
1
and 
2i
=

b
i
+
p
1  
2
g
i

!
2
: We performed 10 draws for each
observation. Lemieux and McLeod (1996) report that simulation based on ten or
twenty draws yielded very similar results.
15
performed a Breusch-Pagan test. As heteroscedasticity prevailed, we re-
gressed the log of the square of the error terms on a set of variables which
yielded signicant coecients. We then used the estimated standard er-
rors to weight the observations so as to preserve homoscedasticity. In the
presence of uncorrected serial correlation in the likelihood function, the
estimators remain consistent but are not ecient, while the estimated
standard deviations of the parameters are no longer consistent. Testing
for rst-order serial correlation in the quantitative part of the model un-
der the assumption of a constant coecient of serial correlation for all
rms, we obtained a coecient of 0.25. With a coecient of this size,
we chose not to correct for autocorrelation (Fomby-Guilky (1978) and
Dagenais (1994)).
6 Analysis of the Results
We estimated the xed-eects model for dierent values of : In table
2 we present the results for  = 0:9
27
. In both parts of the model, we
eliminated the variable nationality of the rm, FC, since its coecient
were not signicant and had little impact on the other results. For the
same reason we dropped the variable retained earnings, RETEARN ,
in the probit part of the model
28
. There is no dichotomous variable
identifying the industry in the probit part of the model, since when all
the rms in an industry do, or do not, perform R & D, this variable
alone explains the entire qualitative aspect for this industry, and hence
its coecient is indeterminate. Also note that we lagged the variables
SALES and stock of physical capital, CAPITAL, and measured for
each rm the industry R & D stock net of the rm's own stock of R &
D.
The coecients for the eective user cost of research have the ex-
pected sign: if the eective cost of R & D declines, the probability that
rms which weren't performing R & D will begin to do so, and the
27
Because the calculations were very time consuming, we only considered a few
values for : For these values, the maximum of the likelihood function increased with
: Because of concerns about the precision of the calculations, we were not able to
explore values higher than  = 0:97: However, for values of  higher than 0:7, the
changes in the estimated coecients were negligible relatively to their standard errors.
For similar reasons of precision, calculations performed in which  was treated as an
additional parameter to be estimated did not converge. Note that xing  may have
as a consequence to underestimate the asymptotic variances of the estimators of the
other parameters.
28
For some observations the retained earnings were negative. We replaced these
values with values slightly above zero. Modifying these values did not materially
aect our results.
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amount of R & D conducted by those already involved, both increase.
This coecient is small and is not signicant in the probit part. In
the regression part, the elasticity of research with respect to its own
user cost is  0:07 in the short term and  1:09 in the long term, given
the estimated speed of adjustment of R & D of six percent per year
29
.
These estimates are compatible with those found in the literature. Con-
sequently, if changes in scal policy were to reduce the eective price of
research by ten percent, the stock of R & D would increase by 0.7% in
the rst year and by 10.9% in the long term.
The stock of R & D, STKRD, increases with the size of the rm.
There appears to be a complementary relationship between research cap-
ital and physical capital, but a substitutability between own R & D and
industry-wide R & D. As expected, the availability of internal funding
increases research eorts, but this coecient is not signicant. Sec-
toral eects (not reported in table 2) may be interpreted as indictors
of technological opportunity. It is not surprising that sectors which are
research intensive, such as telecommunications equipment, oce equip-
ment, pharmaceuticals, scientic equipment, computer services, etc.,
have positive coecients. In the qualitative part, sales and the phys-
ical capital have a negative sign. It appears that, in our sample, there
are fewer large rms than small rms performing research, as it is un-
likely that any one rm will stop conducting research as it grows. Firms
which were performing R & D continue to do so (positive coecient on
the lagged R & D stock variable). Time dummy variables (not reported
in table 2) have a positive sign, indicating an increased propensity to
perform R & D relative to 1975.
We performed sensitivity analysis on the xed-eects model.
1. If we use rm dummies instead of industry dummies, the price
eect becomes insignicant and drops to zero for the short and
for the long term. The model is, in a sense, over-parametrized.
When individual xed eects are included, nearly all the explana-
tory power of the model seems to be captured by these eects. This
type of result is common in longitudinal studies. It is more di-
cult to extract information from the variation of the other variables
over time, in the presence of these individual xed eects.
2. Replacing the time dummies with a trend variable (with or without
a squared term in order to capture the acceleration or deceleration
of technical progress) yields less satisfactory results.
29
The speed of adjustment  of the capital stock toward its long-term equilibrium
is obtained from the coecient (1  ) of the lagged stock of R & D.:
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3. Since the number of rms may vary between industries, it is per-
haps less the total capital stock of the industry than the average
capital stock per rm in the industry that one should look at. We
divided the industry stock by the number of rms performing re-
search or by the total number of rms in that industry. Our results
were only marginally aected. As neither the data on the number
of rms conducting R & D, nor those on the total number of rms
in each industry were very reliable because of changes in the R &
D surveys and in industrial classications, we chose not to retain
these results.
4. The eective price of research is itself endogenous insofar as ceil-
ings on tax credits for R & D may depend on the amount of R
& D performed. If we regress the eective price of research on its
price without ceilings and on other exogenous variables, and use
the resulting tted variable as an instrument, the problem of endo-
geneity is avoided. The short-term price elasticity is then increased
very slightly.
5. We performed a regression with the annual means of the variables
for each rm (only in the quantitative part of the model), omitting
the lagged dependent variable. This is equivalent to performing
an inter-rm estimation and suppressing variations over time, and
yields another estimate of the long-term price elasticity of R & D.
The coecient of the eective price is  1:3, and the t-statistic is
1.7. This estimate appears quite similar to that yielded by our
dynamic model.
6. The lagged R & D stock variable in the qualitative part of the
model captures a large share of the explanatory power of the model,
but does not reveal why a rm performs research. However, if we
omit this variable, we risk increasing the serial correlation of the
error term and inducing an estimation bias since we no longer
account for the individual rm's propensity to perform R & D.
The absolute value of the coecient of the eective price then
increases and becomes signicant in the probit part of the model.
In the regression part, the coecients of the lagged R & D stock
variable and of the eective price are modied so as to make the
long-term price elasticity become unreasonable. Because of this
lack of robustness and the increased risk of serial correlation, we
dropped this specication
30
.
30
In the qualitative part of the model, the log of the stock of lagged R & D was
set to  12 for rms not performing R & D.
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7. To compare with other studies, we also estimated a ow model,
which is consistent with our model if we set the depreciation rate
for research equal to one. Our estimate of the short-term elasticity
of R & D expenditures with respect to the eective price of research
is at least four times smaller than those reported by Hall (1993),
Hines (1993) and Baily and Lawrence (1992) using the ow model
on American data. Our results are close to those reported by
Bloom, Grith and Van Reenen (1997). However, we believe that
the assumption of immediate depreciation is not realistic.
8. Instead of a double-log specication, we tested a linear specication
of the model. Neither the signs nor the orders of magnitude of the
estimated coecients made any sense.
9. We estimated a dynamic specication with nite lags and various
lag structures. These results were even less satisfying.
As noted above, we also considered models with random eects. In
addition, we estimated a simple Tobit model, with xed eects and with
random eects. The maximum values we obtained for the likelihood
functions suggested that these models are less appropriate, judging by
the criteria suggested by Pollack and Wales (1991).
31
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As can be seen in table 2, in the retained solution, the log-likelihood function
is equal to -2136.88. The total number of estimated parameters is equal to 77. For
the random eects model, the value of the log-likelihood function was -3602.28 with
87 estimated parameters. The number of parameters in the random eects model
was larger because, as mentioned before, we included the means of the explanatory
variables as separate regressors. For the simple Tobit model with xed eects, the
log-likelihood was -2412.08 with 53 parameters and for the simple Tobit model with
random eects, the log-likelihood was -2386.90 with 56 parameters.Here we only
included the means of the explanatory variables which yielded signicant coecients,
namely three.
19
Table: 2 Results of the Generalized Tobit Model
Fixed Eects Model with  = 0:9
Probit Part Regression Part
Variables Estimator t-stat. Variables Estimator t-stat.
Intercept  0:6776  1:708 Intercept  0:3574  0:606
ln(CEFF )  0:0169  0:105 ln(CEFF )  0:0686  1:632
ln(SALES
1
)  0:1307  2:505 ln(SALES
1
) 0:0279 1:373
ln(STKRDT ) 0:0499 1:291 ln(STKRDT )  0:0163  1:419
ln(CAPITAL
1
)  0:1283  2:736 ln(CAPITAL
1
) 0:0161 0:927
ln(STKRD
1
) 0:4214 14:701 ln(RETEARN) 0:0312 0:472
ln(STKRD
1
) 0:9369 115:143
time dummy yes time dummy yes
sector dummy no sector dummy yes
Number of observations: 4859 log of the likelihood: -2136.88
7 Eectiveness of Tax Incentives to R & D
Did increases in R & D spending induced by changes in tax policy exceed
the forgone tax revenues?
If we calculate the amount of R & D induced by a dollar of tax
expenditure using Bernstein's (1986) method, we obtain $0.40 in R & D
for each dollar of tax expenditure, which is half of what he obtained
32
.
We propose a new measure. It compares in present value terms the
dierence in R & D expenditures on the old and on the new path of
adjustment toward the respective steady state to the dierence in the
cost incurred by the government to support the R & D by scal policy
in the two scenarios.
Assume that before the change in the scal parameter, , R & D
expenditures (I
t
) tended toward a long-term equilibrium R & D stock,
R

t
: After the change, R & D spending adjusts so that the stock slowly
moves to its new long-term equilibrium. Let I
0
t
; t = 0; : : : ;1; be the
adjusted expenditure on R & D and R
0
t
the new long-term equilibrium
stock. Previously, the government supported some proportion, 
1
; of the
level of R & D expenditures, and a further proportion, 
2
; of the growth
in these expenditures with respect to a certain base. Subsequent to the
change, these values are 
0
1
and 
0
2
respectively. If support to research
has increased, 
0
1
 
1
and 
0
2
 
2
: The government collects taxes at
32
Bernstein (1986) takes the ratio of the change in the value of the stock of research
and the change in the cost of production subsequent to a change in tax policy. The
numerator is interpreted as new investment in R & D while the denominator repre-
sents a direct government subsidy. It can be shown to be equivalent to the ratio of
the elasticity of the stock of R & D (multiplied by the research deator) to the user
cost of R & D.
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the rate (u
f
+ u
p
)
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on the return () to the increased stock of R & D.
The formula we propose to calculate the induced R & D per dollar of
tax expenditure is:
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To better understand this measure it is useful to decompose the de-
nominator. The rst term represents the cost to the government of a
change in the level of R & D. The increase in R & D may be due to a
change in a scal parameter via 
1
and/or 
2
. The second term repre-
sents a simple transfer payment. Notice that if the incentives only aect

2
; the scal transfer disappears. This is a subsidy to R & D expen-
ditures which would be performed in any case. The third term relates
to the dierential in support associated with incremental R & D. The
fourth term represents the additional taxes collected on returns to the
new research.
Let us apply this measure to one percent variations in the dierent
scal parameters which determine the eective cost of research | dis-
tinguishing between eects on those rms which are, and those which
are not, constrained by ceilings. A one percent increase in the federal
tax credit to R & D yields an average of $0.98 additional R & D ex-
penditure per dollar of tax expenditure. This result applies to all the
rms in our sample which perform R & D and which are subject to a
ceiling in their use of federal tax credits. Using this same measure on
rms which are not subject to a ceiling, we obtain $1.04. The possibil-
ity of carry forward and carry back and of immediate reimbursements
seems to remove the eects of ceilings. Furthermore, increases in the
provincial R & D tax credit, which correspond essentially to a subsidy,
yield $1.09 in additional R & D per dollar of tax expenditure
34
. These
orders of magnitude are signicantly lower than most of those reported
recently in the literature. They are, however, close to those calculated
by Bernstein (1986).
33
Additional attention should be paid to the impact tax incentives have on the
probability of performing research. Since,in our case, this is negligible, we ignore it.
34
These results are for values of 
1
; 
0
1
; 
2
; 
0
2
particular to each rm. We assume
that R & D yields an internal after-tax return of 20%.
21
Tax transfers account for over 80% of government support for R &
D. The ineciency of tax credits has been illustrated in the case of
Australia, where a study by the Bureau of Industry Economics (1993)
reported that 83% of R & D eligible for tax incentives would have been
performed in any case. Since these transfers are sizable, it seems ap-
propriate to analyze the behavior of our measure relative to a variation
in the incremental research tax credit. If the only support to research
consisted of tax credits to incremental research, the tax transfer would
disappear, as the government would only be paying a fraction of the new
research and not subsidizing recurring R & D. A one percent increase in
this parameter stimulates $4.00 in extra R & D per dollar of government
expenditure! However,this extremely large amount is misleading; it is
due to the fact that the denominator in equation (7.2) becomes then
very small. It should, in fact, be noted that the growth in research eort
in response to an incremental incentive is minimal, since the elasticity
of the eective price of research with respect to a change in the rate of
credit to incremental research is only  0:01.
The nal scal parameter appearing in the eective price of research
is the corporate income tax rate. On the one hand, a lower rate has
the eect of diminishing government support for R & D (
0
1
< 
1
and

0
2
< 
2
), since rms can deduct less for R & D expenditures. On
the other hand, a lower rate increases after-tax income and therefore
decreases the eective price of R & D. In general, the second eect
dominates
35
. A decline in the corporate tax rate allows the government
to reduce tax expenditures on recurring R & D. Since the eective price
is lower, rms invest more in R & D. Thus, we may even nd a growth in
the level of R & D together with a decline in government outlays. One
could not conclude, however, that such a policy would be fully ecient,
given the numerous other eects it would have on the economy. The
research tax credit seems to us a more targeted and appropriate method
of stimulating R & D.
Before concluding, we wish to underline some of the limits to our
study and suggest future areas of research:
1. We do not know whether support for R & D in Canada may have
prompted some companies to locate in Canada instead of going
elsewhere. This in and of itself, would be worth a study. Hines
(1994b) nds that R & D locates in response to tax considerations,
35
There are exceptions where the eective price for R & D increases with a lower
tax rate. This is the case for Quebec rms which are not taxed at the provincial level
for research tax credits. This is also true for some rms which face ceilings in their
use of research tax credits, but which may use the incremental research credit.
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such as the possibility of tax-free repatriation of royalties generated
by research or the receipt of tax credits prorated to foreign sales.
2. It is likely that the ineciency aspects of tax credits would be
even greater if more of the large Canadian rms had been present
in our sample. Conversely, the incentives provided by tax credits
may be underestimated to the extent that small rms are under-
represented in our study.
3. It is possible that the elimination of rms with fewer than four
observations may have lead us to drop starting rms and hence to
ignore the eect of tax policy on the creation of new rms.
4. We did not account for the possibility that tax credits for invest-
ment in plant and equipment may stimulate research. This may
work two ways. First, tax credits provide companies with internal
liquidity which may serve to fund research projects, while invest-
ments in physical capital can more easily be nanced on capital
markets. Second, inasmuch as the two types of investment are
complementary, support for investment in physical capital stim-
ulates investment in R & D capital. But, two counterarguments
can be raised. First, the two types of investments may prove to
be substitutes. Second, it is not obvious that investments in plant
and equipment Granger-cause investments in R & D. Lach and
Schankerman (1989) actually found the opposite to be true.
5. Our results are biased upward to the extent that some R & D
expenditure claims may be inated in order to benet from tax
credits. However, the complaints voiced by rms concerning the
tight verication process accompanying applications for R & D
tax credits lead us to believe that this bias is probably small. Our
results may be biased downward to the extent that tax incentives
induce rms to conduct informal research not accounted for in our
data (cf. Lipsett and Lipsey (1995) for an evaluation of the latter
in British Columbia).
6. Of the R & D induced by tax incentives, some would not otherwise
have been performed, and this research is probably characterized
by a low rate of return. In other words, we do not know whether
these incentives promoted good or bad projects. To evaluate this,
it would be necessary to have access to data measuring the output
of the research, such as innovations, publications or patents.
7. We did not account for the administrative costs of tax incentives
(auditing, project verication by experts, separate accounting).
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Gunz et al. (1996) suggest that the procedures for claiming R &
D related tax credits generally do not cost rms more that 0.7%
of the amounts claimed. These weigh much more heavily on small
rms, however, where the corresponding gure is about 15%. The
cost to governments of administering these projects must also be
included.
8. Since we adopted a partial-equilibrium analysis we did not consider
the indirect incidence of scal stimulants, as emphasized by Berger
(1993). Firms beneting from tax credits may nd themselves
forced by competition to share some of their tax benets with
other agents (buyers facing lower prices, suppliers receiving higher
prices, and research sta beneting from salary increases).
9. While ceilings on tax incentives were considered, we do not know
whether all potentially available tax credits were in fact claimed.
About 20% of the rms in our sample attained tax-credit ceilings,
while a study by the Department of Finance (1983) reported that
for companies with $50 million and more in equity, 60% of research-
related tax credits went unused in 1981. Clearly, the carry forward,
the carry back, and the immediate reimbursement provisions in-
troduced in 1983 eliminated most of the ceilings which had existed
earlier.
10. In addition to stimulating R & D, tax incentives may encourage
rms to change the pace and composition of their research.
8 Policy Relevance
The reasons given to justify government support for private R & D de-
rive from its public good characteristics. Nonappropriability of benets,
high risk, and enormous nancing requirements all prevent rms from
performing the socially desirable level of R & D, given the externali-
ties it generates. Tax incentives are superior to contractually targeted
research subsidies, because they leave R & D decisions under the con-
trol of the individual entrepreneur, who is more knowledgable about his
market and the required innovations than a political decision-maker can
be. Furthermore, the prospect of losing money or making prots pro-
vides an incentive to make the right choices. The moral hazard of policy
makers joining hands with recipients of research funds to pursue their
own interests at the expense of social welfare is lower with tax induce-
ments than with subsidies. Although contracts and direct subsidies allow
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funds to be channelled to promising projects which would not otherwise
be undertaken, it cannot be assumed that public authorities know the
external benets of the research, the direction in which scientic progress
is moving, and the value of new projects
36
.
Our study nds that one dollar of scal support to R & D yields
$0.98 in additional research. It has also pointed out a possible aw in
the current system of supporting private research through tax incentives.
A proportion of this money (which we estimate at over 80%) nances
research which would be performed even without assistance and thus
resembles a disguised policy of subsidies to research. Even if the magni-
tude of this phenomenon needs to be veried with other data (aggregate
data comprising all research, data on small and medium-sized businesses
and, ideally, data on tax credits actually paid out to rms), the ques-
tion needs to be asked whether better instruments cannot be found to
stimulate research. And, pursuing this line of reasoning further, would
it not be preferable to attack directly the market failures associated with
research and put into place incentive measures which account for asym-
metric information, moral hazard and the nonappropriability of benets
which arise at the dierent stages in the research activities, rather than
give money to anyone claiming to do research?
36
For a discussion of the relative merits of tax credits and direct subsidies to R
& D, see Bozeman and Link (1984). For a general discussion of the eectiveness of
scal support to R & D, cf. Palda (1995), Oce of Technology Assessment (1995)
and Grith et al. (1995).
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APPENDIX
A List of Industries
Table: A1.1 Description of the Industry Variables
Industry Denition SIC 80
agric agriculture, shing and trapping, forestry 010, 030, 040
minem metal mining 061
mines other mines 062
petro oil and gas extraction 070
food food and beverages 100
tobac tobacco products 110
rubb rubber products 151
plast plastics 161
texti textiles 181
wood lumber and wood products, except furniture 250
furn furniture 260
paper paper and allied products 270
print printing, publishing and allied products 280
metxp partially transformed metals (ferrous) 291
metnf partially transformed metals (non ferrous) 295
metal fabricated metal products 300
machi machinery 310
aeron aircraft and parts 321
autom automobiles & parts and accessories 323
eqtrp other transportation 329
eqcom telecommunications equipment 330
tronq electronic parts and components 331
othel other electronic equipment 335
oc oce equipment 336
eltrc other electrical equipment 339
nmetl non metallic minerals 350
rpetr rened fossil fuels 360
pharm pharmaceuticals 374
chem other chemical products 379
scien scientic and professional equipment 391
othm other manufacturing industries 399
const construction 400
energ electricity 410
utils other utilities 420
trans transportation and storage 450
commu communications 480
comp computer and related services 772
engin engineering and scientic services 775
servi retail, wholesale, nancial, insurance, real estate 500, 600, 700,
services, management consultants,
other service industries 777,960
31
B Denitions and Statistical Sources of the
Variables
Table A2.1 Variables with Data obtained from Compustat
Variable Description Compustat
RD R&D expenditures data046
SALES Firm's sales data012
RDI Research Intensity data046/data012
STKRD R&D stock of the rm
REVENUE Revenue before extraordinary
items & depreciation data018 & data014
CAPITAL Physical capital & inventories data08 & data03
ASSETS Total assets data006
RETEARN Retained earnings data036
Table A2.2 Variables with Data not obtained from Compustat
Variable Description Source or Construction
PRD R&D deator Prepared by Stat Can
PQ Production deator Stat Can Cat 15-201
and 15-202
F1 Tax incentives index or B-index Appendix C
EFFRD Eective price of R&D (PRD/PQ)*F
RDT R&D expenditures of the industry Stat Can Cat 88-202
STKRDT R&D stock of the industry
(net of STKRD)
IR Interest rate
DEPR Depreciation rate of the
stock of R&D
EFFC Eective user cost of R&D EFFRD*(IR+DEPR)
FC Foreign control Stat Can Cat 61-517
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C R & D Tax Incentives Index
Notation:
d = percent of R & D expenditures admissible for tax credits
(physical plant excluded)
d

= d+ (1  d)  0:314, where 0.314 is the depreciation rate for
buildings suggested by Warda (1994)
i
O
= dummy variable for Ontario
i
Q
= dummy variable for Quebec
c
f
= rate of the federal tax credit
c
p
= rate of the provincial tax credit
 = reimbursable share of the tax credit
! = rate of tax credit on incremental R & D
 = utilisation capacity of the tax credit for incremental research
n = reference period for the tax credit for incremental R & D
T = admissible carry forward period
T

= admissible carry back period
r = interest rate
u
f
= federal tax rate on corporate prots
u
p
= provincial tax rate on corporate prots
d
L
= percent of labor costs in R & D expenditures

0
= fraction of potentially usable tax credits out of current
and past tax payments

j
= fraction of potentially usable tax credits from
payments in the year t+ j

0
= fraction of R & D expenditure in year t deductible in year t

j
= fraction of R & D expenditure in year t deductible
in year t+ j
G = average present value of carry forward and carry back per
dollar of potential tax credits
H = average present value of a dollar of potential tax credits
Therefore, we have:
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The tax incentives index (F ), or B-index, in other words the eective
cost of a dollar of R & D relative to the net income from a dollar of sales
is thus:
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The denominator of this expression represents income after taxes
from one dollar of revenue. This is the factor by which the output
deator is multiplied in the expression for the eective price of research.
The numerator of F indicates the net price of a dollar of expenditure on
R & D. As to the subtracted terms, the rst represents the reduction in
payable tax resulting from the almost complete deduction (except part
of physical plant) of R & D expenditures. The second term represents
tax benets resulting from federal and provincial research tax credits,
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and the last term captures incremental research tax credits
37 38 39
.
Assumptions:
1. Past taxable income has not already been used for earlier appli-
cations for tax credits when calculating the possibilities of carry
back for unused tax credits.
2. Labor costs account for 50% of total R & D expenditures.
3. Expenditures on physical plant for R & D represent 5% of total R
& D.
4. Forecasts of future income used to calculate the possibilities for
carry forward are perfect.
5. Tax credits to incremental research are 100% usable
40
.
6. The nominal interest rate is xed at 10%.
D Analysis of the Data
As indicated in table A4.2, only seven percent of rms did not survive
until 1992, and a third of those disappeared in 1991. We observe a
substantial increase in the number of rms in 1982. These companies
are not new, but rather newly admitted to the database (for example Air
Canada and Bell Canada). We eliminated those appearing after 1989,
since they had fewer than four observations. Table A4.3 reveals that
only 108 rms from our sample of 434 (after eliminations) perform, or
declare performing, R & D. For about 70 of these we have long series,
comprising at least ten consecutive years. As table A4.4 reveals, in every
year except the rst three, between sixteen and twenty percent of our
rms perform R & D, while the corresponding amount for the entire
Canadian economy was 0.3% in 1980 (Department of Finance (1983)).
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In Quebec, research tax credits only apply to the wages of research sta, and are
only taxed at the federal level.
38
This is a general formulation. The rates take dierent values depending on the
year, the province, and the size of the rm. For example, the incremental rate of tax
credits was 50% on incremental research expenditures (current and capital, including
physical plant) with respect to the average of the three preceding years from 1978 to
1982 (thus d = 1; w = 0:5; n = 3). It disappeared in 1983 (so d = 0), and reappeared,
only in Ontario, in 1988 (d = 0:95; since buildings are excluded, w = 37:5% or 50%
depending on the size, and n = 3).
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Provincial tax credits are 100% reimbursable.
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In any case, tax credits for incremental R & D represent small amounts (cf.
Bernstein (1986), McFetridge and Warda (1983)).
35
Companies performing R & D are thus relatively overrepresented in our
sample.
With few exceptions, we cover all industries in the Canadian econ-
omy (table A4.5). In 1989 we have no more than ten rms in any one
industry performing R & D in our sample, while some industries have
none. Comparison with Statistics Canada data reveals that these are
not research intensive industries. In three industries, our industry totals
are greater than those of Statistics Canada. Since we used Canadian
data published in the United States, we may be inclined to attribute
these incompatibilities to dierences in industrial classication or R &
D denitions, but that is not the case (cf. Deloitte and Touche (1995)).
The following four reasons may explain the divergences:
1. Declared expenditures are revised by Statistics Canada and some-
times excluded if they do not correspond to the ocial denition
of R & D.
2. Amounts declared in annual reports do not correspond with those
declared to Statistics Canada or to Revenue Canada.
3. A rm's R & D is assigned to the industry of its primary area of
activity. This classication may change over time, but Compustat
does not revise a rm's industrial assignment.
4. For the listed companies, the R & D reported by Compustat in-
cludes that performed in other countries. Frequently the extra R
& D originates from a large company with foreign branches (Alcan
for metnf, Moore Corp. for print, Northern Telecom for eqcom,
and Bell Canada for commu).
We have a higher proportion of Canadian than of foreign-controlled
rms in our sample. A larger share of the latter performed research (table
A4.6). Among rms doing R & D, Ontario rms are overrepresented vis-
a-vis Quebec rms (in comparison with data from Statistics Canada, cat.
88-202). Conversely, the average Quebec rm in our sample performs
more R & D than the average Ontario rm (table A4.7), which also
contradicts Statistics Canada's data.
In table A4.8, we group rms by size, using their total average assets
(the average size corresponds to the total average assets of between $25m
and $250m). Whether we use assets, production or employment for size,
two facts stand out: research intensity declines with size, and rms that
do R & D are smaller. This can be explained by the simple omission
of large R & D performing rms in our sample. Small rms are also
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underrepresented. Among those which declare employment (for many
companies this information is missing), only 25% have fewer than 200
workers. Thus our sample is truncated at both ends.
We have a reasonable amount of variation in R & D, and of its de-
terminants, between industries (table A4.9). In 1989, the tax incentives
index (F ) ranges from 0.60 to 1.17 for dierent industries, while for in-
dividual rms it ranges from 0.50 to 1.80. A good deal of this variability
is due to ceilings in the use of tax incentives which are unique to each
rm. In 1989, the relative price of R & D was higher for rms in oil
and gas, rening, and oce automation than for those in other sectors,
because price increases in these three industries were smaller. Missing
data for research intensity indicate sectors or rms with no R & D in
1989. A value of zero represents values less than 0.5%.
The graph in gure 1 shows the evolution of the annual average of
the R & D deator relative to the production deator (RELPRD) for
all rms conducting R & D. Overall, the price of R & D has increased
faster than the production price over our sample period. However, the
relative price adjusted for the index of tax incentives (RELEFFRD), has
increased at a slower rate than the relative price, and even declined in
some years (gure 2). 1983 was marked by dramatic changes in tax
incentives to research. Annual averages reported in gure 2 conceal the
dierences between rms. A typical rm, not aected by ceilings (gure
3), generally saw its eective price (RELNC) decline over the sample
period, while for a rm with ceilings in 1982, 1985, 1989 and 1991 this
eective price (RELWC) shows a very dierent pattern (gure 4).
Table A4.1 Data cleaning process
Sample remaining
obs. rms
Entire sample 5642 573
Entire sample minus rms with less than four observations 5397 487
Entire sample minus subsidized rms (indicated in Compustat) 5360 483
Entire sample minus subsidized rms (elim. of rms
running decits) 5266 472
Entire sample minus rms with inated R&D claims 5388 486
Entire sample minus holding rms 5095 456
Entire sample minus rms with R&D intensity greater than one 5381 483
Remaining sample (after all eliminations) 4859 434
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Table A4.2 Persistence of rms in the sample
Start 79 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Tot.
/End
75 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 127 137
76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 6
82 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 103 109
83 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 16 19
84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20
85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 16 17
86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 17 23
87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 48 51
88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 22 24
89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 19
90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 2 1 0 0 1 4 0 3 5 3 10 404 434
Table A4.3 Persistence of rms performing R&D in the sample
Start 79 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Tot.
/End
75 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 47
76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 19 20
83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3
87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 10
88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9
89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6
90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 103 108
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Table A4.4 Breakdown of Firms Performing R & D, by Year
Year % rms no. of rms total no.
with R&D with R&D of rms
75 0.09 12.00 137.00
76 0.09 12.00 139.00
77 0.10 14.00 141.00
78 0.17 24.00 142.00
79 0.18 26.00 145.00
80 0.19 27.00 144.00
81 0.20 30.00 149.00
82 0.18 45.00 253.00
83 0.17 46.00 269.00
84 0.16 48.00 291.00
85 0.17 51.00 306.00
86 0.17 57.00 330.00
87 0.16 61.00 377.00
88 0.16 64.00 400.00
89 0.19 78.00 416.00
90 0.18 75.00 412.00
91 0.18 73.00 411.00
92 0.18 74.00 404.00
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Table A4.5 Breakdown of Firms Performing R&D, by Industry for 1989
Industry No. rms Total R&D Total R&D Represen- Total no.
perf. R&D in sample Stat Can tativity of rms
($M) ($M)
minem 1.00 3.07 35.23 0.09 41.00
mines 1.00 1.90 10.13 0.19 3.00
petro 3.00 17.20 50.81 0.34 65.00
food 3.00 16.70 60.83 0.27 18.00
tobac 0.00 0.00 8.57 0.00 1.00
plast 2.00 1.44 14.45 0.10 7.00
texti 0.00 0.00 43.66 0.00 2.00
wood 1.00 12.50 17.69 0.71 10.00
paper 4.00 24.22 151.40 0.16 12.00
print 1.00 32.21 8.39 3.84 11.00
metxp 1.00 8.21 23.67 0.35 10.00
metnf 6.00 220.92 138.07 1.60 10.00
metal 2.00 1.70 41.20 0.04 5.00
machi 3.00 12.37 97.54 0.13 5.00
aeron 1.00 0.92 501.72 0.00 3.00
autom 2.00 17.60 68.87 0.26 7.00
eqcom 7.00 913.11 742.08 1.23 8.00
tronq 2.00 0.57 38.50 0.01 2.00
oc 3.00 17.99 293.68 0.06 3.00
eltrc 2.00 2.45 64.69 0.04 5.00
nmetl 2.00 6.14 20.08 0.31 4.00
rpetr 3.00 123.00 149.71 0.82 7.00
pharm 2.00 3.59 176.71 0.02 2.00
chem 4.00 75.65 193.16 0.39 7.00
scien 3.00 31.11 62.02 0.50 4.00
othm 1.00 0.04 25.63 0.00 5.00
const 0.00 0.00 8.24 0.00 6.00
energ 0.00 0.00 222.83 0.00 10.00
utils 1.00 0.16 4.52 0.03 3.00
trans 0.00 0.00 20.09 0.00 11.00
commu 4.00 184.68 118.06 1.56 21.00
comp 8.00 31.64 213.57 0.15 11.00
engin 0.00 0.00 474.03 0.00 2.00
servi 5.00 39.30 474.03 0.08 95.00
All 78.00 1800.37 4621.99 0.39 416.00
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ADDENDUM
To CIRANO`S Scientic Series Working Paper no 97s-34,
\Do Canadian Firms Respond to Fiscal Incentives to Research and
Development"
Table A4.6 Breakdown of Firms Performing R & D,
by Nationality of the Firm's Head Oce
CONTROLLED % rms no. of rms Total no.
with R&D with R&D of rms
canadien 0.22 79.00 358.00
foreign 0.38 29.00 76.00
ALL 0.25 108.00 434.00
Table A4.7 Breakdown of Firms
Performing R & D, by Region
REGION % rms no. of rms Total no.
with R&D with R&D of rms
ONT 0.28 55.00 195.00
BC 0.19 14.00 72.00
QUE 0.32 21.00 66.00
MAN 0.13 1.00 8.00
ALB 0.17 13.00 76.00
NS 0.00 0.00 3.00
NB 0.33 1.00 3.00
SAK 0.75 3.00 4.00
NFLD 0.00 0.00 5.00
PEI 0.00 0.00 2.00
ALL 0.25 108.00 434.00
Table A4.8 Breakdown of Firms Performing R & D, by Size
(by Total Average Assets )
SIZE % no. of sales sales RDI Total
rms rms (means) (means) means no. of
with with of rms of rms rms
R&D R&D without with
R&D R&D
($M) ($M)
small 0.21 15.00 556.34 185.71 0.07 70.00
medium 0.23 42.00 24475.42 5109.72 0.05 182.00
large 0.28 51.00 319498.6 92480.76 0.01 182.00
ALL 0.25 108.00 344530.4 97776.19 0.04 434.00
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Table A4.9 Descriptive Statistics on Variables, by Sector
for Year 1989 (see appendix B for the variables' denitions)
SECTOR R&D SALES EFFRD F1 RETEARN CAPITAL RDI FIRMS
means means means means means means means no.
($M) ($M) ($M) ($M)
MINEM 0.06 83.66 0.81 0.90 41.05 209.64 0.01 41.00
MINES 0.54 96.53 0.74 0.82 30.24 421.50 0.01 3.00
PETRO 0.23 102.47 1.25 0.93 56.64 272.98 0.16 65.00
FOOD 0.80 866.67 0.86 0.81 384.72 415.56 0.00 18.00
TOBAC 0.00 323.15 0.64 0.64 124.41 294.48 . 1.00
PLAST 0.18 114.15 0.69 0.68 31.53 76.05 0.01 7.00
TEXTI 0.00 865.63 0.73 0.69 75.49 556.73 . 2.00
WOOD 1.09 650.63 0.84 0.80 190.70 596.98 0.00 10.00
PAPER 1.73 1233.96 0.66 0.69 326.63 1448.17 0.00 12.00
PRINT 2.58 1167.01 0.64 0.67 418.37 501.75 0.01 11.00
METXP 0.72 1011.38 0.66 0.73 245.76 1094.74 0.00 10.00
METNF 18.08 2323.10 0.75 0.77 504.00 2654.87 0.01 10.00
METAL 0.30 487.58 0.67 0.66 -0.04 175.58 0.01 5.00
MACHI 2.25 262.86 0.64 0.65 61.44 145.84 0.01 5.00
AERON 0.27 773.08 0.94 0.85 69.79 353.04 0.01 3.00
AUTOM 2.33 2615.76 0.79 0.74 289.38 595.94 0.01 7.00
EQCOM 96.32 982.08 0.79 0.68 253.26 387.73 0.08 8.00
TRONQ 0.24 9.63 1.04 0.87 -7.74 2.71 0.02 2.00
OFFIC 5.28 62.46 0.79 0.70 12.44 22.89 0.10 3.00
ELTRC 0.47 204.40 0.63 0.61 47.72 63.27 0.00 5.00
NMETL 1.19 611.95 0.79 0.66 195.35 411.48 0.00 4.00
RPETR 15.92 3181.98 0.87 0.75 1121.81 3035.45 0.01 7.00
PHARM 1.58 2.52 0.58 0.60 -0.83 2.69 0.47 2.00
CHEM 10.02 913.86 0.87 0.94 154.55 1059.09 0.01 7.00
SCIEN 7.06 339.82 0.81 0.86 140.07 110.25 0.08 4.00
OTHM 0.01 133.36 1.20 1.17 15.30 63.11 0.01 5.00
CONST 0.00 206.93 0.74 0.79 32.71 195.00 . 6.00
TRANS 0.00 2032.45 0.93 0.84 613.86 2685.18 . 11.00
COMMU 7.98 621.09 0.85 0.76 210.74 1061.60 0.02 21.00
ENERG 0.00 925.64 0.76 0.80 226.09 1798.40 . 10.00
UTILS 0.04 553.89 1.16 0.93 200.58 650.16 0.75 3.00
SERVI 0.37 1515.00 0.74 0.76 182.40 713.85 0.02 95.00
COMP 2.57 85.05 0.68 0.71 2.36 23.54 0.09 11.00
ENGIN 0.00 257.55 0.74 0.76 61.91 113.34 . 2.00
ALL 3.73 855.48 0.85 0.80 186.77 687.55 0.06 416.00
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